[X] My Assistant

[Guest_BruceMoomaw_*]

(1) The Jan. 2005 "Geochemical News" ( http://geochemsoc.org/archives/gn/gn122.pdf , pg. 9-16) contains an interview with David Des Marais full of intriguing statements of his views on both Mars exploration in particular, and the difficulties of interpreting possible Precambrian fossil evidence in general.

(2) MEPAG's Mars Human Precursor Science Steering group -- which issued its report in mid-2005 -- had a subgroup devoted to determining the necessary measurements to allow safe landings and surface exploration by both unmanned and manned craft, and its report is at http://sirius.bu.edu/withers/pppp/original...resentation.ppt . It's particularly interesting for two reasons. First it summarizes the kinds of measurements that must be made by the atmosphere-oriented 2013 Mars Science and Telecom Orbiter for such purposes -- the biggest problem is wind measurements at various altitudes, which may require development of a Doppler lidar. Second, page 8 indicates that the MER landings were even a nearer thing than we thought:

"Spirit designed with range of atmospheric states for during EDL

• A week before entry TES observation of dust storm changed anticipated
atmosphere

• Based on TES, a new density vs altitude profile was created

• However, the reconstructed atmosphere, done post-flight, indicated a
significantly different density (reduced by 15% between 20-30 km) from TES
calculation, and was very close to the limit of system performance

• Also, steadily increasing oscillations of both Spirit and Opportunity before
parachute deployment nearly exceeded safe range (could get tangled chute).

• Oscillations due to either unexpected atmospheric turbulence (some unknown
aerodynamic instability) or mechanical instability of vehicle in fluid.

• Lesson: The atmospheric state is not well quantified, with both models and
NRT calculations yielding weather predictions with large intrinsic errors

• Lack of atmosphere information may affect vehicle design, possibly creating
unstable descent system

• There are still unexpected turbulent layers, and unexpected affects from large
atmospheric dust storms"
_____________________________

Obviously, we cannot keep running these risks as our landers get bigger and more expensive -- a better understanding of Martian atmospheric behavior and changes is crucial for the immediate future, not just the moderate future.

[djellison]

Hopefully - HiRISE will spot some or all of the EDL hardware to help nail down the failure to a specific time frame of the EDL sequnce.

i.e.

Found : Impact only
Failure during entry and before chute deployment

Found : Chute & Backshell and no heathsield
Entry survived, possible shredded chute / heatshield sep failure

Found: Chute & Backshell and Heatshield but no lander impact.
Failure of lander seperation from backshell

Found: Chute & Backshell, Heathsield and Lander impact
Failure of terminal descent (favoured failure mode after investigation)

Found, Chute, Backshell, Heatshield and a non impacted lander with deployment evidence
Failure of comms / systems onboard

Hopefully, the same will be true of Beagle 2 ( although with different criteria) - and given the results of MOC in finding MER hardware - as long as HiRISE can cover enough area (and even if they just 2x2 bin and jsut use the wider swath width ) they should be able to identify SOMETHING from MPL.

However - HiRISE obs of Pathfinder might be usefull - as I've not seen evidence of Heatshield or Backshell & Chute at the Pathfinder site from MOC, which is somewhat suprising given how obvious they were with MER.

Dust deposition remains an issue, but repeat MOC obs of Spirit and Opportunity might suggest that two years after landing, their hardware remains very visible.

Doug